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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal False Claims Act' (FCA) was enacted in 1863 to protect the
federal government from fraud perpetrated by unscrupulous Civil War
contractors. Today, the law is aimed at those responsible for the $100 billion
or more fraudulently diverted every year from federal healthcare, defense,
and other programs.2 This means that up to ten percent of the entire federal
Carl Pacini is Marguerite and Guy Howard Professor of Accounting and Business Law at
Florida Gulf Coast University in Ft. Myers, Florida and Adjunct Professor of Forensic Accounting at
Florida Atlantic University in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. He has a Ph.D. from Florida State University
and a law degree from the University of Notre Dame. He is a Florida CPA and a member of the Florida
Bar.
Micheal Brett Hood is an FBI Special Agent in Florida. He has worked for the FBI for 14
years. He specializes in white-collar crime.
1 31 U.S.C.§§ 3729-3733 (2006).
2 See Peter Sinton, Whistle-Blowing Gaining Steam: Employees Have Gotten Millions for Exposing
Fraud at Work, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 11, 1997, at El.
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budget is lost annually due to fraud. "In addition to... monetary losses,
fraud also ... erodes public confidence and raises questions about the
government's ability to manage its programs. " 3 For example, fraud may
result in a threat to national security, such as when a defense contractor
certifies defective equipment as meeting required standards.4
The current version of the FCA makes liable "[a]ny person who...
knowingly presents or causes to be presented ... a false or fraudulent claim
[to the U.S. government] for payment or approval.' The law also imposes
liability for making "false record[s] or statement[s designed] to conceal,
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
[United States] Government.6
Many FCA violations involve submission of false information while
presenting payments to the federal government. Below is a sample list of
false claims that have been submitted to the U.S. government:
3 J. Morgan Phelps, The False ClaimsAct's Public Disclosure Bar: Defining the Line Between Parasitic
and Beneficial, 49 CATH. U.L. REV. 247, 247 (1999).
4 Id. at 247 n.5.
5 § 3729(a)(1)(2006).
6 S 3729 (a)(2) (2006). Sections 3729(a)(1)-(2) are the most frequently used provisions of the
FCA. [need supporting citation]. Section 3729(a) states in relevant part:
Any person who-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United
States Government or member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get
a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or
paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the
Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal the
property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for which
the person receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be
used, by the Government and; intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers
the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from
an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who
lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government...
S 3729(a).
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* Alleged health care fraud at a hospital (e.g., U.S. v.
Rogan--involving alleged falsification of annual reports to
Medicare);
* Alleged health care fraud committed by a doctor8
* Submission of false proof of loss claims to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma during 2005;9
* Submission of false claims to receive reimbursements (e.g., U.S.
v. Aker Philadelphia Shipyard, Inc. 1°-involving alleged
submission of false claims to receive training subsidies from the
Department of Labor);
* Billing twice for the same work (e.g.,Al Munford, Inc. v. U.S. n -
involving allegations that a construction company submitted
dual claims for building and repairing washracks at Fort
McClellan, Alabama);
* False negotiation, including defective pricing and bid rigging
(e.g., U.S. v. Erlich12 -involving intentional overstatement of
construction costs on a federally insured mortgage on a housing
project);
* False certification of entitlement for benefits;13 and
* Submission of non-reimbursable expenses for reimbursement
(e.g., U.S. v. Dyncorp" 4 -involving alleged submission of request
See, e.g., United States v. Rogan, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26034 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 27, 2005)
(involving alleged falsification of annual reports to Medicare).
8 See generally, e.g., United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.P.R. 2000) (involving
alleged false claims submitted to Medicare for anesthesia services).
9 Mary Vallis, Katrina Spirit Drowns in Fraud: False Claims, Bribery: Charges Add to Frustration of
U.S. Charities, National Post, Dec. 4, 2006, at A3.?
,o See, e.g., United States ex rel. Gibbons v. Aker Phila. Shipyard, Inc. 2006 U.S. Dist LEDUS 5172
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (involving alleged submission of false claims to receive training subsidies from the
Departments of Labor and Defense).
I See generally, e.g., Al Munford, Inc. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 62 (1995) (involving
allegations that a construction company submitted dual claims for building and repairing washracks at
Fort McClellan, Alabama).
12 Seegenerally, e.g., United States v. Erlich, 643 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1981) (involving intentional
overstatement of construction costs on a federally insured mortgage on a housing project).
13 Kayhan Fatemi & MatthewJ. Lankenau, False Claims on Public Projects: Don't Bet Your Business
On It, Aace Int'l Trans. CDR01.1., available at
http;//www.ibec.org.br/Downloads/falseclaims on_public-projectsdont-bet your-business-on it.pdf
14 See generally, e.g., United States exrel. Longest v. Dyncorp, No. 6:03-cv-816-Orl-31JGG, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEGS 1838 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2006) (involving alleged submission of request for
reimbursement of non-reimbursable expenses under federal contracts to provide cocaine eradication
assistance).
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for reimbursement of non-reimbursable expenses under federal
contracts to provide cocaine eradication assistance).
Private citizens (rather than government attorneys) using a unique
characteristic of the FCA known as the qui tam action are allowed to
challenge FCA violations.1
5
A qui tam plaintiff, also referred to as a qui tam relator, or a
whistleblower, is a private citizen who files a civil lawsuit against an alleged
fraudster on behalf of himself and the U.S. government. If the government
does not pursue the actions, the relator pursuing the case is entitled to "not
less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the
action or settlement. " 16 In addition, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to collect
from the defendants the reasonable attorneys' fees, and expenses incurred
from pursuing the claim.'" In the event that the defendant retaliates against
the plaintiff, the plaintiff "shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the
[plaintiff] whole."" If the federal government intervenes in the lawsuit
initiated by the qui tam relator, the latter is still entitled to "at least 15
percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or
settlement."' 9 Because the FCA's damages and penalty provisions tend to
generate large dollar settlements and judgments, relators' recoveries can
involve substantial sums.20
The FCA qui tam provision contains two features that make it quite
successful as a regulatory and external corporate governance tool. First, the
law facilitates dissemination of inside information of fraud. Complex
financial crimes often cannot be detected without the assistance of those
is "Qui tam" is a term derived from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se,
ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (7th ed. 1999).
16 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2006).
17 Id.
is § 3730(h).
19 § 3730(d)(1).
2D James F. Barger, Jr. et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of Emerging State False
Claim Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465, 475 (2005). For example, SmithKline Beecham "agreed to pay $325
million to the government for filing false claims with Medicare, Medicaid, and other health care agencies
.... " SmithKline Beecham to Pay $325 Million for Health Care Fraud, DAILY REC. (Baltimore), Feb. 25,
1997, at 2. Also, "[t]he University of Illinois settled a lawsuit for $2.3 million after a transplant surgeon
blew the whistle on unnecessary liver transplant practices ... in defrauded Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements." Emily Umbright, Transplant Scam Costs University of Illinois $2.3 Million, ST. Louis
COUNTIAN, Nov. 25, 2003, at 1. And even "[t]he Boeing Co. agreed to pay $2.5 million to the U.S.
Army and $1.4 million to a former employee to settle a fraud lawsuit involving an allegedly defective part
in its Apache attack helicopter." Ed Taylor, Boeing Agrees to Settle Fraud Lawsuit Involving Army, Apache
Helicopter Part, E. VALLEY TRIB. (Mesa), May 17, 2003, at 1.
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who have knowledge of them. However, convincing people to inform or
turn on their employers, co-workers, and partners is not an easy task.2'
Second, the statute provides a means for knowledgeable qui tam plaintiffs to
supplement the strained resources of government attorneys and
investigators. 22 Without the help ofwhistleblowers, the government would
discover few fraudulent transactions and thus, would not be able to secure
many recoveries at all. 23
Citizen involvement has made a significant contribution to the effort to
pursue those who defraud the federal government. Between 1987 and 2003,
over 4,200 qui tam lawsuits were initiated that resulted in the recovery of
over $7.8 billion.24 Despite such recoveries, many law enforcement officers,
regulators, lawyers, auditors, forensic accountants, investigators, financial
managers, academics and others remain uninformed or underinformed
about the FCA as an external corporate governance tool,2 the steps in and
elements of a qui tam claim, limitations of a qui tam action, whistleblower
protection, and the role of qui tam litigation as a weapon in the fight against
fraud. This article provides an overview of the FCA and analyzes some of
the challenges faced by qui tam litigants and the financial crime experts who
assist them.
21 Phelps, supra note 3, at 248. "A survey ofapproximately 5000 federal government employees
reveals that 69% of them believe that they have had direct knowledge of illegalities and failed to report
them." Id. at n.14.
2 Barger, Jr. et al., supra note 20, at 475-76.
23 Phelps, supra note 3, at 249.
24 See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &Jacobson LLP, Qui Tam FCA Statistics (Nov. 20, 2003),
http"/www.friedfrank.coni/quitam/fcastats.htm.
25 The concept of corporate governance has been defined in many ways. See, e.g., Elletta S.
Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational
Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 177, 179 (2002) ("Potential
corporate claimants include shareholders and employees, as well as constituencies slightly more removed
from the corporation, such as creditors, suppliers, and society at large."); Timothy Fort & Cindy
Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All Possible Worlds, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829 (2000) (arguing that good governance practices balance the needs for
efficiency and profit with equitable treatment of corporate constituencies); Oliver Hart, Corporate
Governance: Some Theory and Implications, 105 EcON J. 678 (1995) (arguing that governance invokes
consideration of the relationships between capital providers and top management); Carl Pacini et al.,
Corporate Governance and the Market Impact of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 on Bank Returns
and Trading Volume, 29 J. ECON. FIN. 46 (2005) ("Corporate governance deals with mechanisms by
which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management so that
their interests are protected. The need for corporate governance stems from agency problems created
by separation of ownership and control and the inability to write complete contracts for all possible
future contingencies.").
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II. FILING A QuI TAM SUIT
A qui tam relator or plaintiff who sues under the FCA does so both in
an individual capacity and on behalf of the U.S. government. The legal
claim must be brought in the name of the U.S. government. "By allowing
the relator to bring the action 'in the name of the Government' and by
allowing the relator to receive a percentage of the proceeds that the
government recovers, the legislature left no doubt that the relator is acting
on behalf of the government."26  A copy of the complaint and written
disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information possessed
by the qui tam plaintiff must be filed in camera and a copy sent to the
Department ofJustice (DOJ).27
A. The Disclosure Statement
The disclosure statement is one of the most vital documents a qui tam
plaintiff prepares when initiating an FCA claim. The government must be
provided with a "written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and
information" that serves as a basis for the lawsuit.21 "The purpose of the
written disclosure requirement 'is to provide the United States with enough
information on alleged fraud to be able to make a well reasoned decision on
whether it should participate in the filed lawsuit or allow the relator to
proceed alone.'"
29
Legal authority is scarce on what suffices as a legally sufficient disclosure
statement. Moreover, existing legal authority on the issue is far from
consistent. One group of federal decisions adheres to the position that the
disclosure statement should contain only the relevant facts without much
detail. For example, in United States ex rel. Bums v. A.D. Roe Co., Inc.,30 the
court found that the disclosure statement is simply a recitation of factual
information and does not contain any mental impressions, opinions or
conclusions. A second group of federal opinions recommends that a
26 United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting 31
U.S.C. 5 3730 (2000)).
27 31 U.S.C.§ 3730(b)(2) (2006).
28 Id.
29 United States. ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 555 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting
United States ex rel. Woodward v. Country View Care Center, Inc., 797 F.2d 888,892 (10th Cir. 1986)).
30 904 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Ky. 1995); see also United States ex rtl. O'Keefe v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 918 F. Supp. 1338, 1346 (E.D. Mo. 1996) ("The written disclosure statement should
simply contain all the relevant factual information in [the relator's] possession at the time he filed suit.");
United States ex rel. Robinson v. Northrop Corp., 824 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
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disclosure statement should contain facts, legal theories, analysis, and
opinion. 31 The view that supports inclusion of more than mere facts is more
closely aligned with the purpose of section 3730(b)(2) of the FCA. "[T]he
disclosure statement distills often complex facts and law into a narrative
statement intended to inform the government of the nature of the claims the
relator asserts on its behalf.32 Since the government is inundated with many
qui tam cases, it is essential for the qui tam plaintiff to prepare a thorough
disclosure statement.
The qui tam relator serves his own best interest by producing a
disclosure statement that is thorough but not overdone. Inadequate
disclosure increases the probability that the government may decline to
intervene or move to dismiss the lawsuit. Also, a qui tam plaintiff is typically
awarded less money while incurring substantially more expense when the
government does not join the legal action. In sum, an adequate disclosure
statement involves a balancing act for the qui tam relator:
A relator preparing a disclosure statement today, however, is in a
bind. In one sense it is in the relator's selfish best interest to make
his or her disclosure statement as complete, well-organized, and
persuasive as possible. Otherwise, the relator runs the risk that the
government may decline to intervene (in which case the expense
and burden of prosecuting the action alone may be prohibitive for
the relator), or that the government may move to dismiss the action
on one of the grounds enumerated in the statute. The inadequacy
of the relator's disclosure is one such ground for dismissal.... On
the other had, it is also in the relator's selfish best interest to avoid
full and candid discussion [of] the strengths or weaknesses of his or
33her claims in a disclosure statement....
B. Complaint Under Seal
Once a qui tam plaintiff initiates a lawsuit by filing a complaint in
camera, the complaint and any accompanying material remain under seal for
a minimum of 60 days. 34 The purpose of this requirement is to provide the
federal government with enough information on the alleged fraud to make
31 See generally, e.g., United States ex rel. Grand v. Northrop Corp., 811 F.Supp. 333 (S.D. Ohio
1992) (acknowledging the possibility that the disclosure statement at issue might contain legal analysis
and opinion in addition to facts).
32 United States ex rel. Bagley, 212 F.R.D. at 556.
33 Id. at 557-58.
34 31 U.S.C. S 3730(b)(2) (2006).
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an informed decision on whether to intervene or participate in the lawsuit
or permit the qui tam relator to proceed alone.35  These procedural
requirements are so important that a relator's failure to comply warrants
dismissal of the lawsuit.
In Erickson ex rel. United States v. American Institute of Biological Sciences,36
Dr. James Erickson, the qui tam relator, was an employee of the Agency for
International Development (AID). From 1982 to 1987, he served as a
technical officer for the AID Malaria Project, a program aimed at producing
a malaria vaccine.37 AID contracted with the defendant, American Institute
of Biological Science (AIBS).3s In his qui tam lawsuit, Erickson alleged,
among other things, that funds were diverted to Swiss bank accounts and
used to pay for employees' personal entertainment and travel expenses.39
Erickson had the complaint served on the defendant before ordered by the
district court and failed to keep the complaint under seal for at least 60
days.4° The district court ruled that failure to comply with the procedural
requirements put in place by Congress warranted dismissal of the action.
41
The relator's "failure to comply with the filing and service provisions
irreversibly frustrate [d] the congressional goals ... [of preventing] alleged
wrongdoers from being tipped offthat they were under investigation... and
[of protecting] the defendant's reputation from unfounded public
accusations."42
The FCA provides for a 60-day investigatory period in which the
complaint shall remain under seal43 and allows the government to petition
the court for an extension for "good cause shown."" The legislative history
of the FCA shows that courts are to construe "good cause" narrowly,45 but,
35 See id.
36 716 F.Supp. 908, 910 (E.D. Va. 1989).
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 911.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 912. (citations omitted).
43 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2006).
44 S 3730(b)(3)
45 According to a report issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee:
Extensions will be granted... only upon a showing of'good cause.' The Committee intends
that courts weigh carefully any extensions on the period of time in which the Government
has to decide whether to intervene and take over the litigation. The Committee feels that
with the vast majority of cases, 60 days is an adequate amount of time to allow Government
coordination, review, and decision. Consequently, 'good cause' would not be established
merely upon a showing that the Government was overburdened and had not had a chance
to address the complaint.S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 24-25 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
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in practice, it is not uncommon for government reviews of FCA filings to
take one to two years. 6  One reason for a longer period is that the
government may conduct a criminal investigation, if it is warranted, to
obtain hard evidence using a variety of investigative techniques, including
search warrants or undercover operations.4 V While the lawsuit is under seal,
the government can exercise a number of options to further its investigatory
goals, which, in effect, could enhance the qui tam relator's chance of success.
First, the government can decide to join the civil lawsuit.4" If the
government intervenes then it assumes primary responsibility for pursuing
the lawsuit.4 9 In this instance, the government may not eliminate the
relator's right to continue as a party to the lawsuit, however, it is not bound
by any of the qui tam plaintiff s decisions and may pursue the case as it sees
fit.50 Factors that help the government determine whether to intervene or
not depend on regional factors as well as national strategies. In criminal
investigations, most regulatory and criminal agencies maintain certain loss
thresholds, which exist for informal cost/benefit analysis to make decisions
on how to best deploy available government assets. Loss thresholds vary
from one office to another and while a qui tam lawsuit with a certain
designated loss might be appealing to an agency in Des Moines, Iowa, the
same lawsuit might have no appeal in Los Angeles, California. On occasion,
agencies issue national strategies to combat certain types of fraud that are
prevalent throughout the nation. In these instances, loss thresholds may be
ignored to adhere to national strategy.
When the government intervenes, the qui tam plaintiff may continue to
participate in the litigation subject to certain conditions. If the government
wishes to limit the qui tam relator's participation, the trial court may restrict
the number of witnesses the relator may call, the duration of the witnesses'
testimony, and/or the length of the relator's cross-examination.5 1 The FCA
also permits the trial court to stay discovery for up to 60 days when the qui
tam plaintiffs actions would interfere with the government's investigation.5 2
The government is allowed to pursue the action through an alternative
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289-90.
46 Joel M. Androphy & Mark A. Correro, Federal Qui Tam (False Claims) Litigation:The
Government's Watchdog, 42 HOUS. LAW. at 18, 19 (2005).
47 See Bauman & Rasor Group, Inc., Coordination with the Government and the Government
Investigation, httpI/www.quitam.com.potatt4.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
48 § 3730(b)(4)(A)
49 3730(c)(1).
so Id.
5, § 3730(c)(2)(C.
52 § 3730(c)(4).
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remedy such as administrative relief53 If the government pursues such an
alternative remedy then the qui tam plaintiff retains the same legal rights as
in the initial action. 4 Despite these potential limitations, the qui tam
plaintiff should still participate in the lawsuit because the FCA provides to
the relator a share of at least 15 percent of any damages assessed. 5
Statistically, the government elects to intervene in about 18 percent of all qui
tam cases filed.56
Government intervention does not guarantee that a relator's case will be
brought to a judicial conclusion. Throughout the investigation, the
government maintains the right to decline to pursue the matter further if it
is found that there is a lack of sufficient evidence to support the allegations
or if government finds facts that are contradictory to the disclosure
statement filed in the qui tam action.
When the government intervenes, the relator relinquishes a great deal of
control to determine the outcome of the lawsuit. Government investigators
rarely provide information to the relator concerning any new facts or
evidence uncovered in any investigation. The passage of time without
updates, especially for a relator in a whistleblower-type situation, may be
disconcerting because some investigations take years before findings are
presented to an appropriate judicial body. Often the relator is left to wonder
what, if any, progress has been made to support the allegations made in the
complaint.
A second alternative available to the government is not to participate in
the lawsuit. If the government notifies the court that it will not intervene
then the qui tam relator has the right to conduct the lawsuit.5 7 The
government retains only the right to receive copies of all pleadings filed in
the action and all deposition transcripts, but at its own expense. 8 When the
government declines to intervene, the qui tam plaintiff receives a standard
declination letter that outlines duties and responsibilities to continue pursuit
of the case. After receipt of the letter and removal of the seal (by the court),
the qui tam relator has 120 days to serve the defendant with the complaint.
If the government subsequently decides to intervene in the lawsuit, it
may do so only upon a showing of "good cause." 59 It is unclear how
3 § 3730(c)(5).
54 Id.
55 See S 3730(d)(1).
56 See Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, The False Claims Act Legal Center, Qui Tam
Statistics, http://www.taf.org/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
57 § 3730(c)(3).
58 Id.
59 Id.
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substantial a showing the government must produce to satisfy the "good
cause" requirement. Few cases exist in which the government has tried to
reenter a qui tam action after an initial declination to intervene. 60 None of
these cases explains what limitation the statute places on the government's
discretion.6'
A third option open to the government is to intervene and settle the
FCA action over the qui tam relator's objections. The power to settle the
suit, however, appears to depend on intervention by the government during
the initial 60-day investigatory period.62 A court may accept a settlement if
it is "fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances."' Of
course, a qui tam relator is still entitled to 15 to 25 percent of the settlement
proceeds.
A fourth alternative available to the government is to dismiss the lawsuit.
If the relator objects, the suit may be dismissed only after the government
has notified the qui tam plaintiff and the court has granted the relator a
hearing on the issue. 4 In United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird Neece
Packing Corp.,6 the Ninth Circuit ruled that although the FCA is silent
regarding the circumstances under which the government may dismiss a qui
tam action, the decision to dismiss is analogous to a matter within the
government's prosecutorial discretion. "The [FCA] grants the relators an
opportunity for a hearing on the motion to dismiss, but does not specify any
conditions under which the relator may block the motion."66  "[T]he
function of a hearing when the relator [objects to dismissal of a qui tam
action] is simply to give the relator a formal opportunity to convince the
government not to end the case." 67
III. LIMITATIONS TO FILING A Qui TAM SUIT
The FCA sets up a two-part test to determine whether a federal court
can hear a qui tam case. First, the court must ascertain whether the fraud
allegations are based on publicly disclosed material.' If so, the court then
60 JAMES T. BLANCH ETAL., CITIZEN SUITS AND Qui TAMACTIONS: PRIVATEENFORCEMENT
OF THE PUBLIC POLICY 61-62 (1996).
61 Id. at 61-62.
62 See S 3730(c)(2)(B).
63 Id.
64 S 3730(c)(2)(A).
65 151 F.3d 1139, 1145-47 (9th Cir. 1998).66 Id. at 1144.
67 Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
68 United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (quoting 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A)(1994)..
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must assess whether the relator is an original source of the disclosure.69
Thus, in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the qui tam plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suit is not based
upon a prior public disclosure, or, if it is, that he or she was an original
source of the information.7°
The FCA outlines three ways in which prior public disclosure can
occur:71  (1) in a civil, criminal, or administrative hearing;72 (2) in a• 73
Congressional, administrative, or GAO report, audit or investigation, or (3)
in the media.74 Generally, courts broadly construe what types of disclosures
6 Id. (quoting31 U.S.C.§ 3730(e(4)(B) (1994)). If the answer to the public disclosure question
is negative, then no need exists to ask whether or not the relator is an original source. Id.
70 United States v. Alcan Elec.& Eng'g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 31
U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. Of Trustees of the Leland Stanford, Jr.
Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1998)).
71 No court shall havejurisdiction over an action under this section based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General
or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006). "Courts have applied the expressio unius doctrine [(i.e., the mention
of one thing implies exclusion of another)] to conclude that this is an exhaustive list of the types of
materials and hearings that can trigger the jurisdictional bar." Phelps, supra note 3, at 260 n.111.
7 "Hearing" encompasses both civil complaints and criminal indictments. U.S. ex rel. Siller v.
Becton Dickinson & Co "[T]he disclosure of allegations in [a civil complaint] consitute[s] a 'public
disclosure of allegations' in a civil 'hearing."'United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21
F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir. 1994). With respect to administrative hearings, the issue of what constitutes
a "hearing" and thus a "public disclosure" is not so cut and dry. See, e.g., A-I Ambulance Serv. Inc. v.
California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that disclosures made during a competitive
bidding process constituted "administrative hearings"); Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 221
F.3d 580, 582 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that an administrative complaint filed with the FAA is considered
an "administrative hearing"); United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 21 F.Supp.2d 607,
614-15 (E.D. La. 1998) (holding that a school board meeting where allegations of FCA violations
occurred was not an "administrative hearing"); Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 81 F.3d 1465,
1473-74 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission was an "administrative
hearing").
73 In United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 39 F.Supp. 2d 28, 31, 32, 34 (D.D.C.
1999), an audit report prepared by the Office of Inspector General and reviewed by an outside
accounting firm indicated that a government contractor had submitted flawed products while certifying
their completeness. The district court held that a qui tam suit was based upon a public disclosure and
was thus barred. Id. at 34. In United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 1999), the
court held that information that was disclosed to the Farmers' Home Administration involved public
disclosure thus precluding a qui tam action.
74 31 U.S.C.S3730(e)(A)(4)(2005). Courts have applied the expression unius doctrine (i.e., the
mention of one thing implies exclusion of another) to decide that this is an exhaustive list of the types
of materials and hearings that can trigger the jurisdictional bar. Phelps, supra note 3, at 260.
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fall into these categories.75 The broader a court construes these types of
disclosures, the more likely it is that a case will be barred by a court.76
Disputes exist among courts, however, over how accessible the information
must be to the public to trigger thejurisdictional bar.' The disputes revolve
around whether information must actually be disclosed to the public or be
capable of public disclosure.78
In United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Cotp.,79 qui tam
relator Ramseyer became aware of widespread noncompliance with
Medicaid requirements. On an independent basis, the Oklahoma
Department of Human Services discovered the same deficiencies through
an audit.'u Three copies of the audit report were prepared though no copy
was released to the public or made available to the public.8 ' The district
court held that the audit report had been publicly disclosed because the
information had been disclosed to a government official (a stranger to the
fraud).' The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that public
disclosure means more than the mere theoretical or potential availability of
information.' An affirmative act of public disclosure is necessary to invoke
the jurisdictional bar of §3730(e)(4)(A). 4 Most, but not all, other circuits
follow the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit.85
The Third Circuit is one that does not follow the Tenth Circuit. In
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, PA. v. Prudential Ins.
75 U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149 (3rd
Cir. 1991)(Construing the term "hearing" to incorporate more than just formal proceedings; it includes
any information disclosed in connection with criminal, civil, or administrative litigation); U.S. ex rel.
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C.Cir. 1994)("It is clear from the statutory
context that the term 'hearing' was intended to apply in a broad context of legal proceedings under
§3730(e)(4)(A)"); J. Androphy & M. Correro, Whistleblower and Federal Qui Tam Litigation-Suing the
Corporation for Fraud, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 23 (2003).
76 Phelps, supra note 3, at 260.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 90 F.3d 1514, 1517 (10th Cir. 1996).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1518.
83 Id. at 1519.
84 Id. According to the Tenth Circuit, "the 'affirmative disclosure' interpretation of the public
disclosure bar coheres with the twin purposes of the FCA: '(1) to encourage private citizens with first-
hand knowledge to expose fraud; and (2) to avoid civil actions by opportunists attempting to capitalize
on public information without seriously contributing to the disclosure of fraud.'" Id. at 1519-20 (quoting
United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indust., 971 F.3d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992)).
85 See United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995);
United States ex rel.Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d 645, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Co.,' the appellate court ruled that narrative memos obtained during the
discovery process but not filed with the court was public disclosure.' The
court placed emphasis on whether the relevant documents could be filed,
not on whether they were actually filed.'
A federal court can hear a qui tam action based upon information
previously disclosed to the public if the qui tam plaintiff is the original
source of the information.' The FCA defines an original source as "an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information
to the Government before filing an [FCA] action" based on such
information. 90 "Direct knowledge is knowledge gained by the relator's own
efforts" rather than learned secondhand through the efforts of others.9'
"Independent knowledge" is knowledge obtained apart from any public
disclosure.' One purpose of the disclosure statement (filed by the qui tam
relator) is to help the court decide whether the qui tam plaintiff has "direct
and independent knowledge" necessary to maintain a suit where information
has been publicly disclosed.
Courts, however, are split three ways in the interpretation of the original
source's relationship with the publicly disclosed information. One group of
courts requires that the qui tam relator must be the source of the public
disclosure.93 More specifically, one court ruled that three conditions must
be met for a plaintiff to qualify as an original source: (1) the relator must
have direct and independent knowledge of the allegations; (2) the qui tam
plaintiff must voluntarily provide the information to the government before
filing suit; and (3) the relator must have directly or indirectly been a source
to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations. 94 According to a second
set of court decisions, the identity of the discloser is irrelevant as when the
96 944 F.2d 1149, 1158-60 (3d Cir. 1991).
87 Id. at 1158.
88 Id. at 1159.
89 See 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
90 S 3730(e)(4)(B)(2006).
91 United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 799 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quoting United States ex tel. Fine v. Advanced Sciences, Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1996
92 Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1048 (8th Cir.
2002) (citing United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995); United
States ex rel. Grayson v. Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc., 221 F.3d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing United
States ex tel. Detrick v. Daniel F. Young, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 1010, 1016 (E.D. Va. 1995)); Vickie J.
Williams, Dead Men Telling Tales: A Policy-Based Proposalfor Survivability of Qui Tam Actions Under the Civil
False Claims Act, 83 NEB. L. REv. 1073, 1104-05 (2005).
93 United States ex rel. Wangv. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412,1419 (9thth Cir. 1992); Phelps, supra
note 3, at 267.
94 United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990).
2007] THE ROLE OF QUI TAM ACTIONS
original source provided the information to the government.95 The third
school of thought requires the original source to disclose the information to
the government before it is publicly disclosed.96 Other limitations on qui
tam claims also apply.
If the qui tam plaintiff is convicted of criminal conduct stemming from
his or her role in the violation of the FCA, "that person shall be dismissed
from the civil action and shall not receive any share of the proceeds of the
action."97  Even masterminds of fraud perpetrated against the federal
government may receive awards for initiating a qui tam suit if they are not
criminally convicted. The amount of the reward is not guaranteed and may
be reduced by the court to zero. 98 Courts may not entertain lawsuits brought
by a member of the armed forces, or those against a member of the armed
forces for actions stemming from military service. 99 No qui tam suit may be
filed against "a member of Congress, a member of the judiciary or a senior
executive branch official if the action is based on evidence or information
known to the government when the action was brought."' Moreover, a qui
tam action against a state is barred since a state or state agency is not a
"person" for purposes of qui tam liability. 10' Local governments, such as
95 See United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1547 (10th Cir. 1996);
Cooperv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield ofFla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562,568 (11th Cir. 1994); United States exrel.
Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 (4th Cir. 1994).
96 See United States exrel. Findleyv. FPC-BoronEmployees' Club, 105 F.3d 675,690 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (holding that there is no requirement that an original source be a source to the disclosing entity
but he must provide the information to the government before public disclosure); United States ex rel.
McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm, Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a qui tam
plaintiff must apprise the government of the purported fraud before public disclosure of the
information).
97 31 U.S.C.§ 3730(d)(3) (2006).
[A] careful analysis of the potential relator's role in the submission of false claims to the
United States must be made before arranging for a client to blow the whistle to Government
prosecutors. If some question exists concerning the extent of a client's participation in
criminal conduct, a thorough explanation of the risks to the [relator] is in order.
James B. Helmer, Jr., How Great Is Thy Bounty: Relator's Share Calculations Pursuant to the False Claims Act,
68 U. CIN. L. REv. 737, 746 (2000).
98 S 3730(d)(3)
Under the sliding scale of awards contemplated by Congress, the basement is clearly occupied
by those relators whose conduct is so reprehensible as to lead the trialjudge to conclude that
substantially rewarding the relator would do great injury to public policy.
Helmer, supra note 97, at 748.99 §3730(e)(1).
150 § 3730(e)(2)(A).
101 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000). The
Supreme Court has a longstanding interpretive presumption that "person" does not include the
sovereign. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941).
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cities and counties, however, are amenable to suit according to the holding
in Cook County, Ill. v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler. 10 2
IV. ELEMENTS OF A QuI TAM CLAIM
The FCA applies to a wide range of misconduct potentially harmful to
the federal treasury. Most FCA cases are brought pursuant to §§3729(a)(1)
and (2). Section 3729(a)(1) establishes liability for submitting a false claim
and section 3729(a) (2) creates liability for making or using false records in
support of a false claim. Section 3729(a)(7) is also growing in popularity in
qui tam suits.0 3 All legal claims filed under §3729(a) require proof of several
elements to establish a violation of the FCA: (1) a "claim" must be
presented to the government by the defendant, or the defendant must
"cause" a third-party to submit a claim; (2) the claim must be made
"knowingly"; (3) the claim must be "false" or "fraudulent"; (4) the claim
must be material (while not in the statute, many courts require proof of
materiality); (5) causation; and (6) the claim must have resulted in damage
to the federal government.
A. "Claim"
The determination of whether an actual "claim" has been made is often
not a simple task. The existing FCA contains a broad definition of what
constitutes a "claim":
For purposes of this section, "claim" includes any request or
demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or
property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient
if the United States Government provides any portion of the money
or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government
will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any
portion of the money or property which is requested or
demanded."
A claim includes not only a demand upon the federal government for
the payment of money or the transfer of property but a demand upon a
contractor, grantee, or other recipient of government funds where the U.S.
102 538 U.S. 199, 122 (2003).
103 J.T. BOEsE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qul TAM ACTIONS § 2.01 [G] (2003).
104 31 U.S.C. S 3729(c)(2006).
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government provided any portion of the money which is requested or
demanded.'x5 The definition makes no distinction between money provided
as a fixed sum and money provided under an open-ended program, but
rather is broad enough to include any request for money which was
originally obtained from the federal government. 1 6  Moreover, the
definition encompasses any attempt to cause the government to pay out
money to a third party.0 7 In effect, any action by a claimant which causes
the government to make a payment it is not obligated to make, or any action
which intentionally deprives the government of money it is lawfully due, is
properly deemed a "claim" within the FCA.'08
The FCA does not attach liability to the underlying fraudulent activity
or to the government's wrongful payment, but to the "claim for payment."
In deciding whether a false statement is a claim or demand for payment, a
court should determine whether the statement had the practical effect of
inducing wrongful payment. ' 9 Examples of a "claim" for FCA purposes
include false certifications of compliance with federal environmental, safety,
and health regulations as a condition of payment for explosive and
pyrotechnic devices,"0 a fraudulent inducement of physicians to bill for
services not rendered,"' supplying false cost and pricing data to the federal
government in connection with a contract, 112 kickbacks," 3 and a markup
scheme inflating costs for the repair of government laptop computers.
114
B. Made "Knowingly"
Prior to 1986, a qui tam plaintiff had to prove the defendant had acted
with knowledge of the false or fraudulent claim. In other words, the FCA
105 Wilkins ex rel. United States v. Ohio, 885 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
106 Id. at 1062-63.
107 See, e.g., United States exrel. Fahnerv. Alaska, 591 F.Supp. 794 (N.D. I11. 1984); United States
v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976) (stating false claims may be presented through an innocent third
party); United States v. Veneziale, 268 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1959) (explaining that a lender's claim for
mortgage insurance benefits is a claim under the FCA).
,0s Androphy and Correro, supra note 46, at 35-36. See also United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703,
709-10 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Richard Datmer Architects, 972 F.Supp. 738,746-47 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
109 Rivera, 55 F.3d at 709-10.
Ito United States ex rel. Holder v. Special Devices, Inc., 296.F. Supp. 2d 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
III United States v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
112 United States ex rel. Campbell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (M.D. Fla.
2003).
"1 United States ex rel. Barrett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C.
2003).
11 United States v. Rachel, 289 F.Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2003).
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required proof of specific intent to defraud. The 1986 statutory
amendments changed this requirement."' The qui tam plaintiff no longer
had to prove specific intent to defraud on the part of the defendant. The
knowledge requirement was satisfied if the fraudster had "actual knowledge"
of the falsity of the claim, acted in "deliberate ignorance of the truth or
falsity" of the claim, or acted with "reckless disregard of the truth or falsity"
of the claim.'16 The requisite intent is the knowing presentation of what is
known to be false." 7
A showing of deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth of
the claim satisfies the "knowingly" element. Negligence and innocent
mistake, however, are not sufficient to establish liability.'" An interesting
application of the "knowingly" requirement occurred in U.S. v. Lorenzo. 19
In that case, Dr. Lorenzo and several other dentists performed oral cancer
screenings as part of routine dental examinations at nursing homes in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey.'20 The cancer screenings, after being billed
to Medicaid, were then billed to Medicare as limited consultations.' 2' The
evidence showed that Lorenzo knew that Medicare rules state that "limited
consultations" do not include procedures during routine screenings.'2 The
court found that Lorenzo, at the very least, acted in reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the claims made.' 2
Another interesting example of a court analyzing the FCA "knowingly"
requirement occurred in Lamb Engineering & Const. Co. v. U.S. 124 In the
course of performing a contract with the Department of Energy, Lamb
Engineering submitted five progress billings, four of which were supported
by attached invoices from subcontractors and suppliers. 25 On four
occasions, Lamb certified that it had made payments to subcontractors,
despite having failed to pay all its suppliers and subcontractors (because of
ns United States v. Data Translation, Inc., 984 F.2d 1256, 1266 (1st Cir. 1992).
116 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2006). See also United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., Inc., 24 F.3d 292,
296 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Christopher C. Frieden, Protecting the Government's Interests: Qui Tam Actions Under
the False ClaimAct and the Government's Right to Veto Settlements of Those Actions, 47 EMORYL.J. 1041 (1998).
117 United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416,1421 (9th Cir.
1991).
118 Androphy&Correro,supra note 46, at 36-37. See also Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1421; United States
v. Oakwood Downriver Med. Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302,305 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
119 768 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
120 Id. at 1129.
121 Id. at 1129-30.
122 Id. at 1131.
123 Id. at 1132.
124 58 Fed. CI. 106 (2003).
125 Id. at 108.
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retention or a holdback of funds under a clause in its subcontracts). 26 The
Court of Claims found that these actions indicated deliberate ignorance or
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the claims submitted by Lamb.
127
By not requiring proof of specific intent to defraud, Congress and the
judiciary have extended liability to almost anyone associated with a false or
fraudulent claim. Government vendors and others who submit claims for
payment to the government have a strong incentive to make sure that their
claims are accurately presented. The broadened knowledge requirement
makes it risky for individuals to look the other way with regard to a
fraudulent claim.128 However, even the broadened intent or knowledge
requirement may not be met under certain conditions.
Some courts have ruled that certain circumstances may not meet the
threshold intent requirement and negate liability under the FCA. 129 In U.S.
ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW, Inc.,'30 the government hired a contractor to dredge
a sedimentation pond. A facility official thereafter instructed the contractor
to submit invoices for unperformed excavation work instead of invoices for
dredging.' 3' The contractor complied, was paid by the facility, and Durcholz
sued as a relator alleging that the contractor knowingly submitted false
claims.3 2 The Seventh Circuit upheld a summaryjudgment for the contrac-
tor on the basis that "[i]f the government knows and approves of the parti-
culars of a claim for payment before that claim is presented, the presenter
cannot be said to have knowingly presented a fraudulent or false claim."'
33
C. "False" or "Fraudulent"
The Supreme Court has stated that the FCA is not designed to reach
every kind of fraud committed against the government.3 3 The words "false"
126 Id. at 110.
127 Id. at 111.
128 Friedman, supra note 116, at 1057-58.
129 Abigail Avery, Weapons ofMass Construction: The Potential Liability ofHalliburton Under the False
Claims Act and the Implications to Defense Contracting, 57 ALA. L. REV. 827, 834 (2006).
130 189 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 1999).
131 Id. at 544.
132 Id..
133 Id. at 545. In addition to the Seventh Circuit, at least four other circuit courts recognize that
prior government knowledge of an allegedly false claim can negate the "knowingly" element required
for an FCA violation. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kreindler v. United Technolgies Corp., 985 F.2d
1148 (2d Cir. 1993); Hagood, 929 F.2d at 1416; Shawv. AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 579
(10th Cir. 2000); United States ex re/. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284 (4th
Cir. 2002).
134 United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958).
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and "fraudulent" were not defined by Congress in the FCA. These terms
have been interpreted by the courts through application of common law
principles. For example, since the FCA uses the disjunctive connector "or,"
no need exists for a qui tam plaintiff to prove a claim is both false and
fraudulent. Either will do.
135
A false claim may take many forms, the most common being a claim for
goods or services not provided, or provided in violation of contract terms,
specification, statute, or regulation. 136  Although the determination of
whether the defendant in a given case submitted a false or fraudulent claim
depends on the court's application of the FCA, a regulation, or a
contract,violations of laws or regulations alone do not create a cause of
action under the FCA.137 In Hindo v. University of Health Sciences,138 the
Seventh Circuit indicated that a claim must be based on fabrication or lie.
The withholding of information critical to the government's decision to pay
is the essence of a false claim. 139 A government vendor or contractor may
defeat a finding of falsity, however, when a contract or regulation is subject
to more than one reasonable interpretation.
Courts have generally held that contractors are not liable under
ambiguous or vague contract terms when the contractor's interpretation is
reasonable." 4 For example, the court in U.S. v. Napco International, Inc.1
41
held that because the Arms Control Export Act was ambiguous and the
defendant government contractor reasonably believed that the law did not
apply, the claim was not false or fraudulent under the FCA. In that case, the
government contractor purchased American-made military supplies from an
Israeli corporation. 42 The government claimed that the Arms Control
Export Act required contractors to buy items from American firms.43 The
135 James B. Helmer,Jr.&JulieW. Popham, Materialityand the False ClaimsAct, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
839, 845 (2003).
136 See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).
137 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996); United States ex
rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng'g, 214 F.3d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
136 65 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1995).
139 See, e.g., United States ex rel Fallon v. Accudyne, 921 F.Supp. 611 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Randall
M. Levine, Note, Enforced Separation: Utilizing the False Claims Act to Prosecute Government Contractors
Spending Federal Funds in Violation of Church/State Regulations, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155 (2005).
140 Avery, supra note 129, at 833; See also United States ex rel. Oliver v. Parsons Co., 195 F.3d 457
(9th Cir. 1999).
141 835 F. Supp. 493 (D. Minn. 1993).
142 Id. at 495.
143 Id. at 496-97.
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contractor read the statute to allow procurement from foreign entities so
long as the items were of American origin.1"
Similarly, in U.S. ex rel. Lindenthal v. General Dynamics,'4 the contractor
defendant contracted with the Air Force to provide engineering drawings for
a complex, mobile radar system. The qui tam plaintiffs alleged that General
Dynamics knowingly produced inadequate drawings because they were not
"build-to-print" quality and therefore violated the FCA.146 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that extrinsic evidence admitted
at trial to interpret ambiguous contract terms indicated that the contractor
performed work that met Air Force standards. 147 The Court concluded that
General Dynamic's payment claim was not false.'" Hence, a reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language or contractual provisions
may impact a court's decision on whether an FCA claim is false or
fraudulent.
D. Materiality
Surprisingly, the False Claims Act does not contain language that
indicates a false or fraudulent claim must be "material" to impose liability.
The operative provisions of the FCA contain 3,000 words and "materiality"
is not one of them.14 9 A review of all versions of the FCA since its
enactment in 1863 demonstrates that the word "materiality" has appeared
only twice. The word is present twice in 31 U.S.C.§3730(b)(2) and
describes the type of evidence a qui tam plaintiff must supply to the
government at the time of filing the complaint. 150 Despite these facts, many
courts have held that "materiality" is one of the required elements of an FCA
claim.' l
In U.S. ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. ofAlabama, s2 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly stated that the FCA imposes a materiality
requirement. Also, the court determined that although materiality is a
mixed question of law and fact, it is one for the court.'53 Other courts have
144 Id. at 497.
145 61 F.3d 1402 (9th Cir. 1995).
14 Id. at 1410.
147 Id. at 1411-12.
148 Id. at 1412.
149 Helmer & Popham, supra note 135, at 843.
150 Id.
151 Gregory Brooker, The False ClaimsAct: Congress Giveth and Congress TakethAway, 25 HAMLINE
L. REV. 373,392-92 (2002).
152 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997).
153 Id. at 1460.
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also insisted that the qui tam plaintiff prove materiality to make a successful
claim under the FCA.'- 4 In U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. North American Construction
Corporation,1'5 the court indicated that the common law meaning of the term
"false claim" is fraud. Materiality is defined as whether the false or
fraudulent claim has a "natural tendency to influence agency action or is
capable of influencing agency action."
15 6
Despite this legal position, some courts and legal commentators assert
that a judicially imposed materiality requirement cannot be supported.'57
Indeed, such a requirement is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in U.S. v. Wells, 158 where the Court concluded that materiality is not
an element of a criminal FCA offense. Courts and commentators have
reasoned that since the criminal FCA provisions have no materiality
element, it is illogical to impose such a requirement upon the parallel civil
provisions, which are rooted in the same original legislative enactment.
5 9
On the other hand, some legal commentators maintain that the
inclusion of a materiality element in the civil FCA can be squared with the
Wells opinion:
By contrast, the civil provisions of the FCA do imply materiality.
While the term "false statement" does not connote materiality, the
term "false claim" necessarily does. A "statement" can be
determined to be true or false, regardless of whether the statement
would have any material (influential) effect on its intended
recipient. But a "claim" cannot be determined to be true or false
without consideration of whether the decision maker should pay the
claim-that is, a claim is "false" only if the Government or other
customer would not pay the claim if the facts about the misconduct
alleged to have occurred were known."6°
154 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mathews v. Healthsouth Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 706 (W.D. La.
2001) (holding that a materiality requirement exists under the FCA); Tyger Const. Co. v. United States,
28 Fed. CI. 35 (Fed. Cl. 1993); Brooker, supra note 152, at 842-44.
155 101 F. Supp. 2d 500 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
156 United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 1116, 1122 (4th Cir. 1984).
157 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Roby v. The Boeing Co., 184 F.R.D. 107 (S.D. Ohio 1998);
United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F. 3d 1048 (9hh Cir. 2001); Brooker, supra
note 153, at 391-92; Helmer & Popham, supra note 137, at 840-41.
15s 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
159 Helmer & Popham, supra note 135, at 841-42.
160 Clarence T. Kipps, Jr., Robert K. Huffinan & Peter B. Hutt II, Materiality as an Element of
Liability Under the False Claims Act, 1998 INST. ON CIV. FALSE CLAIMS ACT&QuI TAMENFORCEMENT
B-45 TO -46.
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E. Causation
Several courts have ruled that an FCA defendant's action must be the
cause of the government's loss. The causation element under the FCA is
satisfied if a person "presents or causes to be presented," a false or fraudulent
claim to the U.S government for approval. 161 In U.S. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Cicero,162 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government
only needed to prove that it would not have made a payment "but for" the
false statement to establish cause. Under this test, an act or failure to act
(i.e., submitting a claim) is not the cause of making a payment if the
payment would have occurred regardless of the act or omission.
The FCA applies to any person who knowingly assisted in causing the
government to pay claims that were grounded in fraud, without regard to
whether that person had direct contractual relations with the government. 163
Thus, a person need not be the one who actually submitted a claim for
payment. In U.S. v. Krizek,'" a doctor was held liable for false claims
prepared by his wife where he delegated to her the authority to submit
claims on his behalf. In U.S. v. Mackby, 165 the defendant was found to have
knowingly caused false claims to be submitted to Medicare by instructing a
clinic's billing company and office manager to file claims.
The FCA allows for significant civil monetary damages to be awarded
against a defendant who submits a fraudulent claim to the government.
Violators are liable for a civil penalty of $5,500 to $11,000 per claim plus
three times the government's damages."6 Federal courts differ, however, as
to whether the federal government must suffer fiscal harm before a qui tam
suit may be filed. In other words, some courts require the qui tam plaintiff
to prove injury or damages as an element of an FCA violation while other
courts do not. We will examine each legal position in turn.
161 Androphy & Correro, supra note 75, at 35-6; Michael M. Mustokoff& Carrie Nelson, The
False Claims Act and the Recent Trend Toward Kindler, Gentler Interpretations, 5J. Health Care Compl. 15
(2003).
'62 957 F.2d 1362, 1374 (7th Cir. 1992).
163 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
164 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
165 261 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2001).
166 31 U.S.C. S 3729(a) (2006). While the statute indicates a penalty of $5,000 to $10,000 per
claim, the Department of'Justice increased the penalty amount by 10 percent to adjust for inflation. See
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, S 31001 (s) (2), 110 Stat. 1321-358,373
(1996).
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(I) STATUTORY PENALTY REQUIRES NO DAMAGES
According to the FCA, liability for a false claim is not contingent upon
the government suffering damages. Congress did not include a reference to
actual payment of a claim by the federal government as an element of an
FCA violation. 67 Therefore, some courts have held that the government
does not have to sustain damages to invoke FCA liability. 16 The focus of
FCA liability is on the presentment of the false claim, not the payment of it.
By attaching liability to the claim itself, Congress decided that fraud against
the government is best deterred by attacking the act that presents the risk of
wrongful payment by the United States. The government need not wait
until the false claim is paid before liability attaches.' 69 Hence, an FCA qui
tam suit may be initiated to recover civil penalties without showing actual
compensatory damages. 7 °
(n) THE CLAIM MUST CAUSE MONETARY LOSS OR BE CAPABLE OF
CAUSING MONETARY LOSS
Another line of cases requires that the false claim actually result in
financial loss to the federal government. The payment does not have to
exceed what a legitimate provider would have received.'7' For example, in
U.S. v. Silver, 7 2 the defendant allegedly cashed checks for his bankrupt firm
that should have been deposited. Since the defendant paid the
subcontractors on whose behalf the payments were made, the government
admitted that it had not suffered actual damages. 73 Nonetheless, Silver's
actions were deemed by the court to fall within the FCA.174 In another case,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the submission of inflated
legal bills to a bankruptcy court did not result in liability under the FCA
because the government did not suffer economic loss. 175 As a practical
167 See S 3729(a)(1).
168 See, e.g., Tyger Constr. Co. v. U.S., 28 Fed. Cl. 35 (Fed. CI. 1993); United States v. Hughes,
585 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1978); Falon 921 F. Supp at 611.
169 Brooker, supra note 151, at 393.
170 See, e.g., Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997); Hagood,
921 F.2d at 1421;Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm
Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. ,121, 184-86 (2001).
171 Krause, supra note 170, at 184.
172 384 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1975).
173 Silver, 384 F. Supp. at 620.
174 Id.
175 Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001).
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matter, fraud enforcement efforts would be hindered if no legal cause of
action arose until the government paid the claim. 17
6
(III) FINANCIAL DAMAGES ARE REQUIRED
A minority of cases hold that damages are necessary for the government
to recover under the FCA. Such a legal position receives weak statutory
support from the language contained in §3731(c), which lists damages as an
essential element of an FCA claim that must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.'" This section addresses FCA procedure
such as the burden of proof that must be met by the government (or qui tam
relator). 78 In U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, PA. v. Provident
Life & Accident Insurance Company, 179 the court ruled that damages must be
established to find an FCA violation. Other courts have similarly ruled that
the qui tam relator must provide specific proof of damages to the
government for liability to adhere. s°
V. THE RELATOR'S RECOVERY
The FCA sets out three types of monetary interest in a claim. First, the
statute awards the relator a percentage of the total recovery ranging from
fifteen to thirty percent.'' Second, the law provides for reasonable expenses,
attorneys' fees, and costs to the relator who pursues the claim.8 2 Third, if
the qui tam plaintiff has been discharged, demoted, suspended, harassed, or
discriminated against by his or her employer because of lawful acts then the
relator is entitled to all necessary relief. 1 3 We examine each of these three
monetary interests in turn.
176 Krause, supra note 170, at 185.
177 Id.; 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c)(2006).
178 Krause, supra note 170, at 185.
179 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
180 See, e.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001); Wilkins ex rel. United States v. Ohio, 885
F. Supp. 1055 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
181 31 U.S.C. S 3730(d)(2006).
182 Id. This provision only applies to the qui tam plaintiff who prosecutes the case, not to those
instances where the government assumes the action. Id. See also Joseph Hoffer, Comment, Qui Tam:
Survival of the Action and Fate of the Proceeds Following the Death of the Relator, For the King andfor Himself...
and His Heirs, 37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 199, 214 n.69 (2005).
183 31 U.S.C. S 3730(h) (2006). Whistleblower protection is available to any employee who
participates in the qui tam action on behalf of the government or relator. Id. It also includes reinstate-
ment to the same seniority status, twice the amount of back-pay including interest, and special damages.
Id. This relief is based on a separate legal action. Id. See also Hoffer, supra note 183, at 214 n.70.
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A. Factors Considered in Setting the Relator's Award
The False Claims Act provides the court discretion in the determination
of the relator's share of any recovery. The statute itself, however, establishes
some guidelines. Several factors control the relator's percentage, including
whether the government assumes the action and the significance of the
relator's contribution to the case.' As noted above, relators who are
criminally convicted cannot recover. Qui tam plaintiffs who are not con-
victed but are the masterminds of the fraudulent claims fall into the zero to
ten percent range. Plaintiffs who base their suit mainly on publicly disclosed
information (for which they were not the discloser) and in whose case the
government later intervenes also fall into the zero to ten percent range.185 In
cases where the government joins the qui tam suit and the relator is the
original source of information (or the case is not based on publicly disclosed
information), the relator receives between 15 and 25 percent of the
recovery."8 6 In those cases in which the government does not intervene, the
qui tam relator is awarded between 25 and 30 percent of the recovery. 8 7
The federal government has developed internal guidelines in
establishing an appropriate share for qui tam plaintiffs. These guidelines are
as follows:
When trying to reach agreement with a relator as to his share of the
proceeds, or proposing an amount or percentage to a court, we
suggest that you begin your analysis at 15 percent. Then consider
if there are any bases to increase the percentage based on the criteria
set forth below. Having done this, consider if that percentage
should be reduced based on the second set of criteria. Of course,
absent one of the statutory bases for an award below 15 percent
discussed at the end of these guidelines, the percentage cannot be
below 15 percent (or 25 percent if we did not intervene).
Items for consideration for a possible increase in the percentage
1. The relator reported the fraud promptly
2. 'When he learned of the fraud, the relator tried to stop the
fraud or reported it to a supervisor or the Government
184 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). See also Hoffer, supra note 182, at 215.
185 S 3730(d). See also Helmer, supra note 97, at 756.
186 S 3730(d)(1).
187 S 3730(d)(2).
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3. The qui tam filing, or the ensuing investigation, caused
the offender to halt the fraudulent practices.
4. The complaint warned the government of a significant
safety issue.
5. The complaint exposed a nationwide practice.
6. The relator provided extensive, first-hand details of the
Fraud to the Government.
7. The Government had no knowledge of the fraud.
8. The relator provided substantial assistance during the
investigation and/or pretrial phase of the case.
9. At his deposition and/or trial, the relator was an excellent,
credible witness.
10. The relator's counsel provided substantial assistance to the
Government.
11. The relator and his counsel supported and cooperated with
the Government during the entire proceeding.
12. The case went to trial.
13. The FCA recovery was relatively small.
14. The filing of the complaint had a substantial adverse impact on
the relator.
Items for consideration for a possible decrease in the percentage
1. The relator participated in the fraud.
2. The relator substantially delayed in reporting the fraud or filing
the complaint.
3. The relator, or relator's counsel, violated FCA procedures:
a. complaint served on defendant or not filed under seal.
b. the relator publicized the case while it was still under seal.
c. statement of material facts and evidence not provided.
4. The relator had little knowledge of the fraud or only suspicions.
5. The relator's knowledge was based primarily on public
information.
6. The relator learned of the fraud in the course of his
Government employment.
7. The Government already knew of the fraud.
8. The relator, or relator's counsel, did not provide any help after
filing the complaint, hampered the Government's efforts in
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developing the case, or unreasonably opposed the Government's
position in litigation.88
If the courts are to carry out Congressional intent to encourage the filing
ofqui tam suits, then generous relator's awards should be forthcoming. The
government is still left whole due to the treble damages and enhanced
penalty provisions. Ultimately, the fraudster is paying the relator's share.8 9
B. Whistleblower Relators
Employees who initiate qui tam lawsuits under the FCA against their
employers are protected by the statute from retaliation. The FCA states
"[a]ny employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened,
harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and
conditions of employment by his or her employer [because of filing a qui
tam action] shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee
whole."' 90 This statutory provision is designed to deter retaliatory action by
an employer who has filed a qui tam lawsuit alleging fraud against the
government.
A qui tam plaintiff must prove three elements to sustain a whistleblower
action under the FCA: (1) the employee must have engaged in conduct
protected under the statute; (2) the employer must have been aware of the
employee's conduct; and (3) the employee must have been discriminated
against because of engaging in protected conduct.' 91 As to the first element,
the qui tam plaintiff need not have actually filed suit under the FCA to
receive protection. 192 The second element requires that a reasonable jury
could infer that the employer had reason to believe that the employee was
contemplating a qui tam action.' 93 The third element shifts the burden of
proof to the employer to show that the employee would have been
terminated, demoted, or suspended regardless of the suit. 94 Certainly,
§3730(h) of the FCA and controlling court decisions encourage qui tam
employee-relators to pursue actions against fraud aimed at the government.
188 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RELATOR'S SHARE GUIDELINES (1996); reprinted in CLAIRE M.
SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUDAGAINST THE GOVERNMENTApp C-2-1 to App. C-2-3 (2005).
189 Helmer, supra note 97, at 760-61.
190 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2005).
191 See Mikes, 889 F. Supp. 746; United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir.
1996).
192 See Mikes, 889 F. Supp. 746.
193 Id.; Frieden, supra note 116.
194 Mikes, 889 F. Supp. 746.; Consolidated Edison of NewYork, Inc. v. Donovan, 673 F.2d 61
(2nd Cir. 1982).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The False Claims Act is a potent weapon in the arsenal of auditors,
lawyers, fraud investigators, regulators, and whistleblowers. Individual
plaintiffs may initiate lawsuits on behalf of the government and themselves
against those who defraud the federal government. A qui tam plaintiff may
pursue legal action even when the federal government chooses not to
participate in a lawsuit. In any qui tam recovery, the relator is entitled to a
maximum of 25 percent of the damages and up to 30 percent when the
government does not intervene.
Once a qui tam relator initiates a lawsuit by filing a complaint in camera,
the complaint and accompanying material remain under seal for a minimum
of 60 days. While the lawsuit is under seal, the government can exercise a
number of options, includingjoining the lawsuit, deciding not to intervene,
intervening and settling the lawsuit, or dismissing the lawsuit.
A federal court may not hear a qui tam suit brought under the FCA if
the case is based on a public disclosure and the relator is not an original
source of the information on which the fraud allegations are based. Previous
public disclosures can occur in ajudicial or administrative hearing, a govern-
ment report, or in the media. If the qui tam plaintiff is the original source
of the FCA lawsuit allegations then prior public disclosure is irrelevant.
Any FCA claim requires that the qui tam relator prove several elements.
First, the defendant must present a "claim" to the government or the
defendant must cause a third party to submit a claim. Second, the claim
must be made "knowingly." Third, the claim must be "false" or
"fraudulent." Fourth, according to some courts, the claim must be material./
Fifth, the defendant's action must be the cause of the government's loss.
Sixth, and finally, according to some courts, the claim must have resulted in
damage to the federal government.
The FCA awards the qui tam relator between 15 and 30 percent of the
total recovery as a finder's fee. The statute also allows the relator to receive
reasonable expenses, attorneys' fees, and costs for bringing the action. A qui
tam employee-relator may file a whistleblower action by proving that he or
she engaged in protected conduct, and the employer thereafter discriminated
against the employee for engaging in protected conduct.
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